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USING DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS IN FAIR
HOUSING ACT CLAIMS: LANDLORD

WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SECTION 8
VOUCHER PROGRAM
Rebecca Tracy Rotem *
The FairHousingAct (FHA) outlaws discriminationin housing based on
race, color, religion, national origin, and sex. A plaintiff can win an FHA
claim using a disparate impact theory by showing that the defendant's
actions had a disproportionatelyadverse impact on a protected class. This
Note will address a circuit court split on whether a landlord can be held
liablefor discriminationunder the FHA for withdrawingfrom the Section 8
voucher program. Section 8 is a government program that provides lowincome citizens with vouchers to pay a portion of their rent. Many voucher
recipients are minorities or persons with disabilities. The U.S. Courts of
Appealsfor the Second and Seventh Circuits have held that, as a matter of
law, a landlord who withdrawsfrom the Section 8 voucher program cannot
be held liable under the FHA, even if that action has a disproportionate
impact on a protected class. In contrast, the Court of Appealsfor the Sixth
Circuit has held that a plaintiffcan rely on evidence of disparateimpact to
show that a landlordviolated the FHA by withdrawingfrom Section 8. This
Note argues that in order to meet the FHA s goal of ending housing
discrimination,landlords who withdrawfrom the Section 8 programshould
not be given a categoricalexemption from liability under the FHA if that
action has a disparateimpact on a protected class.
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INTRODUCTION
The concentration of the poor in central cities creates a number of serious
social problems. In poor urban areas, children often attend schools of low
quality, and adults tend to lack access to employment opportunities ....
The resulting social dynamics exacerbate behavioral problems such as
educational failure, detachment from the labor force, teen-age pregnancy,
substance abuse, and violent crime. In turn, these social problems
increase the class bias, racism, and fear of the middle class toward the
minority poor, thus accelerating middle class flight to exclusionary
suburbs. I
1. Mark A. Malaspina, Note, Demanding the Best: How To Restructure the Section 8
Household-Based Rental Assistance Program, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 287, 292 (1996)
(footnotes omitted).
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Racial and economic segregation in the housing market has been a major
problem throughout this country's history. In 1968, Congress enacted the
Fair Housing Act (FHA) as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to
combat racial segregation. 2 In 1974, to further combat the concentration of
poverty and racial segregation in housing, the government developed the
Section 8 voucher program, which
supplies vouchers to low-income tenants
3
to assist with rental payments.
Yet, despite receiving vouchers to help with rental payments, people with
these government benefits still encounter real difficulties obtaining housing.
Specifically, Section 8 discrimination is a major housing issue. 4 Under the
Section 8 voucher program, recipients can use the voucher to pay a portion
of their rent.5 Yet, participation in the Section 8 program is voluntary for
landlords. 6 Once a landlord has chosen to participate in the program, a
landlord can withdraw for many reasons. Given that many of these voucher
recipients are minorities or persons with disabilities, there is a potential for
landlords to withdraw from the program for discriminatory reasons. 7 "[A]s
.. neighborhoods have gentrified, voucher holders are finding that
property owners who might have taken their vouchers in the past are now
turning them away .... "8

2. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631 (2006)).
3. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat.
633 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (2006)).
4. See Manny Fernandez, Despite New Law, Subsidized Tenants Find Doors Closed,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at B 1.
5. HUD.gov, Housing Choice Voucher Program (Section 8), http://portal.hud.gov/
portal/page/portal/HUD/topics/housing-choicevoucher.programsection_8
(last visited
Feb. 10, 2010).
6. See Graoch Assocs. #33 v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human Relations
Comm'n, 508 F.3d 366, 376 (6th Cir. 2007).
7. See Fernandez, supra note 4. Handicap and race are two protected classes under the
Fair Housing Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
8. Fernandez, supra note 4. This information from the New York Times is especially
valuable because New York City has the largest Section 8 program in the country. I MERYL
FINKEL & LARRY BURON, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., STUDY ON SECTION 8
VOUCHER SUCCESS RATES, QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF SUCCESS RATES IN METROPOLITAN

AREAS 2-2 (2001), availableat http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/sec8success_1.pdf.
Gentrification is typically defined as "[tihe restoration and upgrading of a deteriorated or
aging urban neighborhood by middle-class or affluent persons, resulting in increased
property values and often in displacement of lower-income residents." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 755 (9th ed. 2009). John A. Powell and Marguerite Spencer point out in their
article that while many gentrification studies ignore race, "gentrification has a very clear
racial component. Commonly, higher-income white households replace lower-income
minority ones ....
John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old "OneTwo ": Gentrificationand the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 How. L.J.
433, 436 (2003). Similarly, community organizers in New York City "'think that [refusing
to accept Section 8 vouchers] is really about gentrifying neighborhoods and the fact that this
is a way for landlords to do race and gender discrimination under a nice-sounding name."'
Manny Fernandez, Bias Is Seen As Landlords Bar Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at
Al (quoting Bertha Lewis, executive director of New York Acorn).
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In turn, courts struggle with finding a solution for plaintiffs if a landlord
withdraws from the Section 8 voucher program. A split has developed
among federal appellate courts. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh
and Second Circuits have held that if a landlord withdraws from the Section
8 voucher program, the landlord cannot be sued for discrimination under
the FHA using a disparate impact analysis. 9 In 2007, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a decision "[d]isagreeing with the
position taken by the Second and Seventh Circuits, [and held] that a
plaintiff can ...

rely on evidence of some instances of disparate impact to

show that a landlord violated the Fair Housing Act by withdrawing from
Section 8."10

This Note will address this circuit court split on whether a landlord can
be held liable for discrimination under the FHA for withdrawing from the
Section 8 voucher program. This Note argues that in order to meet the
goals of the Fair Housing Act, landlords who withdraw from the Section 8
program should not be given a categorical exemption from liability under
the FHA if their action has a disparate impact on a protected class. If a
plaintiff can prove a disparate impact on a protected class, the burden
should shift to the defendant to show a legitimate business reason for the
action in order to avoid liability.
Part I of this Note outlines the history and purpose of the Fair Housing
Act and Section 8 vouchers and describes disparate impact claims. Part II
explains the circuit court split and the reasoning behind each court's
decision. In Part III, this Note explains why the approach in Graoch
Associates #33 v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human Relations
Commission11 should be adopted. Courts should hold that, as a matter of
law, landlords can potentially be liable for violating the FHA if
withdrawing from the Section 8 voucher program disparately impacts a
protected class.
I. EXPLORING THE FAIR HOUSING ACT, SECTION 8, AND THE DISPARATE
IMPACT TEST

This part describes the background of the issues germane to
understanding the circuit split. Part I.A describes the history and the
purpose of the FHA. Part I.B describes the history and the purpose of the
Section 8 voucher program. Lastly, Part I.C describes the disparate impact
analysis and how it is used to find violations of the FHA.

9.
Knapp
10.
11.

Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 302 (2d Cir. 1998);
v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir. 1995).
Graoch, 508 F.3d at 369.
508 F.3d 369.
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A. History and Purposeof the FairHousing Act
Segregated housing has a long history in the United States. 12 Modernday racial segregation in housing dates back to 1890.13 From 1890 to 1940,
a period known as the Great Migration, African Americans moved in large
numbers from the South and settled in urban areas in the North.' 4 During
this time period, African Americans "cluster[ed] together" in urban areas. 15
The segregation, both economic and racial, that resulted from the Great
Migration has persisted for many reasons. 16 For instance, for much of the
twentieth century, racially restrictive zoning regulations were legal,
neighborhoods employed racially restrictive covenants, and public housing
projects were specifically segregated. 17 Additionally, realtors steered
different races to different neighborhoods, and the element of voluntary
18
segregation in housing existed as well.
The court system has been at the forefront of ending government support
of racial segregation, beginning with Shelley v. Kraemer'9 in 1948. In
Shelley, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the legality of racially restrictive
covenants. 20 The covenant in the neighborhood in that case provided that
"property shall not be used or occupied by any person.., except those of
Caucasian race." 2 1 The Court found that such covenants violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the plaintiffs were
22
denied the same property rights as other citizens on account of their race.
This ruling outlawed a segregative practice that was common in many
neighborhoods.
After Shelley, the next major advance in fair housing was the passage of
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.23 Title VIII codified the FHA. 24
During its enactment Congress stated that "[i]t is the .policy of the United
States to provide ...

for fair housing throughout the United States.

'25

The

FHA "bans discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, and sex in virtually all transactions relating to housing," including
26
rental transactions.
12. See generally STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, As LONG As THEY DON'T MOVE NEXT DOOR
(2000).
13. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1965, 1976-77 (2000).
14. Id.

15. Id. at 1976.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See MEYER, supra note 12, at 7.
See id.
See, e.g., id. at 17; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 1977.
334 U.S. 1 (1948); see MEYER, supra note 12, at 151.
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4.

21. Id. at 6.
22. Id. at 20-21.
23. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 3601-3631 (2006)).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
25. Id. § 3601.
26. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 1 (1983) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§§ 3601-3619); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
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The legislative history of the FHA shows that the riots of the summer of
1967 brought to light the major problems of the nation's inner cities and
spurred Congress to pass the bill. 27 To solve this problem, the FHA aimed
to end "the exclusionary attitude of some municipalities toward subsidized
'28
housing [that] contributed to the segregated housing patterns.
29
The passage of the FHA was a major fair housing accomplishment.
Both Shelley and the FHA showed that courts and the government would
not support housing discrimination. James A. Kushner, a law professor and
housing discrimination scholar, suggests that it is important for the
government and courts to take affirmative
steps to end discrimination
30
because otherwise they tacitly endorse it.
Our country still needs to aspire to end housing segregation. The reality
today is that although Congress passed the FHA in 1968, racial segregation
in housing remains prevalent. 3 1 Studies indicate that urban cities in the
United States are only slightly more integrated than during the time
Congress enacted the FHA in 1968.32

B. The Section 8 Voucher Program
To understand Section 8, this Note looks at the history and background of
the program, requirements for the program, and, finally, current problems
and potential solutions that exist for the program.

27. See SCHWEMM, supra note 26, at 33-35 (quoting Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan
Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 496-97 (S.D. Ohio 1976)).
28. Id. at 127. It is interesting to note that "discrimination in housing is a major
contributing factor to racial isolation in urban schools." Id. at 34 (quoting Laufman, 408 F.
Supp. at 496-97). So, by solving housing problems we can also take a step towards solving
education problems. See Christopher P. McCormack, Note, Business Necessity in Title VIII:
Importing an Employment DiscriminationDoctrine into the FairHousing Act, 54 FORDHAM
L. REv. 563, 577 (1986) ("In addition to its primary effect on the housing opportunities of
minorities, [racial segregation] .. .has significant secondary effects in school segregation
and employment opportunity.").
29. See MEYER, supra note 12, at 215 (noting that in major cases since the Fair Housing
Act's enactment, the courts have supported the Act's prohibition of discrimination).
30. See James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second

Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1049, 1050-51 n.5 (1989) [hereinafter
Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988] (citing JAMES A. KUSHNER,
APARTHEID IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY RACIAL

RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1980); James A. Kushner, Apartheid in

America: An Historicaland Legal Analysis of ContemporaryRacialResidential Segregation
in the United States, 22 How. L.J. 547 (1979)).
31. Lisa M. Krzewinski, Book Note, Section 8"s Failure To Integrate: The Interaction
of Class-Based and Racial Discrimination, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 315, 315 (2001); see
also MEYER, supra note 12, at 1.
32. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 1966 (citing DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY
A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 81

(1993); David M. Cutler et al., The Rise and Decline of the American Ghetto, 107 J. POL.
ECON. 455, 495 (1999); Richard H. Sander, Comment, Individual Rights and Demographic
Realities: The Problem of FairHousing, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 874, 884 (1988)).
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1. History and Purpose of Section 8
Congress passed the Housing and Community Development Act in
1974. 33 In passing the Act, Congress reasoned that "the future welfare of
the Nation and the well-being of its citizens depend on the establishment
and maintenance of viable urban communities as social, economic, and
political entities."'34 In order to meet this goal, the Act provided for "the
development of viable urban communities, by providing decent housing and
a suitable living environment and expanding economic opportunities,
principally for persons of low and moderate income." 35 This Act created
36
the Section 8 voucher program, which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f.
Like the FHA, the Section 8 voucher program aimed to end the segregation
37
and "concentration of poverty" in the housing market.
Prior to the creation of Section 8, housing for the poor consisted of largescale, traditional public housing units, which often resulted in
"concentrating the misery and hopelessness of poverty in large, segregated
38
projects that [were] toxic to . . . the residents of public housing."
Proponents of Section 8 "envisioned it as a way for poor urban minorities to
escape the social ills of the city and move to the suburbs." 39 By allowing
recipients to use their vouchers at any private apartment, the program
intended to enable recipients to move outside of the concentration of
40
poverty found in public housing projects in the inner city.
Additionally, unlike traditional public housing, recipients of
governmental subsidies "would not bear the social stigma of residing in
housing complexes created for the poor."4 1 Providing alternatives to public
housing projects would help avoid the social problems associated with the
42
concentration of poverty in inner cities.

33. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (2006)).
34. Id. § 101(b), 88 Stat. at 634.
35. Id. § 101(c), 88 Stat. at 634.
36. Id. § 8, 88 Stat. at 662-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006)).
37. Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing Act's New
Frontier,31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 155, 158 (1996); see also Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 8(a),

88 Stat. at 662 (reciting that the statute was enacted "[f]or the purpose of aiding lowerincome families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed
housing").

38. J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban
Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 528, 531 (2007) (noting, in
addition, that "[h]ousing subsidies .. will remain a cornerstone of approaches to poverty
and to urban planning").
39. Krzewinski, supra note 31, at 318.
40. See Byrne & Diamond, supra note 38, at 605.
41. Malaspina, supra note 1, at 296.
42. See id. at 292.
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2. Requirements
The Section 8 program has many requirements. It "is the largest
subsidized housing program in the U.S. '4 3 To qualify for the voucher
program 44 a household must earn below 50% of the "Area Median
Income." 45 Once enrolled in the program, recipients who qualify for rental
subsidies should be able to use the vouchers to live in any neighborhood
46
they choose.

Voucher recipients find and rent private units, and with the vouchers, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) subsidizes their
rent. 47 Tenants pay 30% of their income to rent a private apartment, and
48
the vouchers subsidize the rest of the rental payment.
A set of rules determine which apartments qualify for the program. To
qualify for the program, the apartment must rent at fair market value. 4 9 If
the apartment rents at above fair market value the voucher recipient can pay
extra to make up the difference. 50 But, "[i]f the total tenant payment for a
unit would exceed 40 percent of the recipients' income, the unit does not
meet the program requirements," and the tenant cannot use his or her
51
voucher to rent that apartment.
People who apply for the Section 8 program are placed on a waiting
list. 52 It often takes years for application approval. For example, in New
York City a tenant can remain on the waiting list for over fourteen years

43. FINKEL & BURON, supra note 8, at 1-1.
44. Section 8 is part of the Housing Choice Voucher Program, which it is sometimes
called. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2009).
45. LAWYERS' COMM. FOR BETTER Hous., INC., LOCKED OUT: BARRIERS TO CHOICE FOR
HOUSING VOUCHER HOLDERS, REPORT ON SECTION 8 HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER
DISCRIMINATION
4,
available at
http://lcbh.org/images/2008/1 0/housing-voucherbarriers.pdf; see also Fernandez, supra note 8 (noting that under this fifty-percent

calculation, to be eligible would require making "no more than about $35,000 for a family of
four in New York" and that the "rent limits for voucher holders seeking apartments are
$1,069 for a one-bedroom and $1,556 for a four-bedroom" apartment); HUD.gov, Housing
Choice
Vouchers Fact Sheet, http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/hcv/about/
factsheet.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
46. See HUD.gov, Housing Choice Voucher Program, supra note 5; see also Beck,
supra note 37, at 186.
47. HUD.gov, Housing Choice Voucher Program, supra note 5; see also FINKEL &
BURON, supra note 8, at 1-1.

48. HUD.gov, Housing Choice Voucher Program, supra note 5; see also FINKEL &
BURON, supra note 8, at 1-1; Beck, supra note 37, at 157.

49. HUD.gov, Housing Choice Voucher Program, supra note 5.
50. See id.; see also FINKEL & BURON, supra note 8, at 1-1; Laura Bacon, Note, Godinez
v. Sullivan-Lackey: Creating a Meaningful Choicefor Housing Choice Voucher Holders,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1273, 1278-79 (2006).
51. FINKEL & BURON, supra note 8, at 1-1; see NYC.gov, New York City Housing
Authority, Section 8 Assistance, Information for Tenants, http://www.nyc.gov/htmlU
nycha/html/section8/tenantinfo.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2010); see also Bacon, supra

note 50, at 1278-79.
52. See HUD.gov, Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, supra note 45; see also Bacon,
supra note 50, at 1273.
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before being approved for the program. 53 Once a person is approved for a
voucher he or she next needs to find an apartment with a landlord who will
54
The apartment must also meet the program's
accept the voucher.
55
requirements.
Under federal law, enrolling in the Section 8 voucher program is
voluntary for landlords. 56 This means that a landlord can decide whether to
accept Section 8 vouchers as rental payment. If a landlord opts to become
part of the program, HUD sets rules that the landlord must follow. 57 For
example, "landlords must make their units conform to [HUD's Housing
Quality Standards] before they can rent to voucher recipients." 58 Initially,
and each subsequent year that the landlord and the Section 8 tenant renew
be inspected to make sure it complies with the
the lease, the apartment must
59
requirements.
program's
3. Problems with the Section 8 Program
One of the major problems with the voucher program is that voucher
recipients encounter difficulties finding apartments to rent. In 2001, HUD
released a study of the success rates of voucher holders in finding and

53. Kate Pastor, Prized Housing Tickets Now Must Find Matches, CITY LIMITS, Aug. 3,
2007, http://www.citylimits.org/content/articles/viewarticle.cfn?articleid=3383.
54. See HUD.gov, Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, supra note 45; see also Byrne
& Diamond, supra note 38, at 605-06.
55. See HUD.gov, Housing Choice Voucher Program, supra note 5; see also FINKEL &
BURON, supra note 8, at 1-2; infra note 58 and accompanying text.
56. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 1998).
Many states and municipalities now have rules prohibiting discrimination against Section 8
voucher holders, such as Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York City, and Chicago. In those
areas a landlord cannot refuse a tenant solely because he or she will be using a voucher to
pay a portion of the rent. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (LexisNexis 2008) (stating that
Massachusetts forbids rental discrimination "because [an] individual is . .. a recipient, or
because of any requirement of [a] public assistance, rental assistance, or housing subsidy
program"); Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1112-13 (N.J. 1999)
(holding that Section 8 vouchers constitute a lawful source of rental payment and cannot be
discriminated against); LAWYERS' COMM. FOR BETTER Hous., INC., supra note 45, at 4
(noting that the city of Chicago passed an ordinance making it "illegal in the City of Chicago
to either refuse to accept housing vouchers or to discriminate in any way against tenants
based on the fact that they are participating in the voucher program"); Fernandez, supra note
4 ("In March [2008], New York City enacted a law making it illegal for landlords to
discriminate against tenants who planned to use federal subsidies known as Section 8
vouchers to help pay their rent."). But see Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272,
1283 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that "section 8 vouchers do not constitute a lawful source of
income" so they are not protected by a Wisconsin antidiscrimination housing law).
Landlords argue that statutes requiring landlords to accept Section 8 vouchers as rental
payment "turn a voluntary program riddled with bureaucratic problems into a mandatory
one." Fernandez, supra note 8.
57. See HUD.gov, Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, supra note 45.
58. Beck, supra note 37, at 157-58; see also HUD.gov, Housing Choice Vouchers Fact
Sheet, supra note 45.
59. See HIUD.gov, Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, supra note 45; see also Bacon,
supra note 50, at 1279.
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securing apartments to rent. 60 In the first study, in the early 1980s, "506 1
percent of Section 8 certificate holders succeeded in finding housing."
From 1985 to 1987, 68% had success; in 1993, 81% had success; but in
2000, only 69% had success. 62 The low success rates can be attributed to
landlords declining to accept vouchers either because of discrimination
against voucher holders
or due to the burdens the program places on
63
housing providers.
a. DiscriminationAgainst Voucher Holders
Despite the passage of the FHA in 1974, "pervasive racial discrimination
and segregation exist within the public housing system, particularly in the
Section 8 Program." 64 One problem with the program's implementation is
that since participation in the Section 8 program is voluntary, many
65
recipients are unable to find landlords to accept the vouchers.
66
Discrimination against voucher holders is a general problem.
"The
widespread discrimination reduces the utility of the voucher program, [and]
frustrates the purported goal[] of the legislation," which is to end housing
67
segregated by race and income.
Participating in Section 8 benefits landlords. For example, it expands the
number of people who can afford to rent the apartment and guarantees a
certain amount of payment each month, decreasing the likelihood of missed
rental payment. 68 Nevertheless, Section 8 voucher holders are turned away
69
regardless of their ability to pay the rent.
60. FINKEL & BURON, supra note 8.

61. Id. at 1-2.
62. Id.
63. See infra Part I.B.3.b.
64. Bacon, supra note 50, at 1306 (citing Florence Wagman Roisman, Long Overdue:
Desegregation Litigation and Next Steps To End Discrimination and Segregation in the
Public Housingand Section 8 Existing Housing Programs,4 CITYSCAPE 171, 171 (1999)).
65. Beck, supra note 37, at 158-59. "Possession of a Section 8 subsidy marks its holder
as a low-income person, a status that carries with it a multitude of negative stereotypes." Id.
at 162; see also Malaspina, supra note 1, at 288.
66. Bacon, supra note 50, at 1273.
67. Id.
68. See Beck, supra note 37, at 166. Accordingly, in tight markets it takes longer for
voucher holders to find an apartment, which supports the assertion that when landlords are
desperate for tenants, more landlords will participate in the program and it is easier for
Section 8 voucher holders to rent. See FINKEL & BURON, supra note 8, at 2-3 (stating that
Section 8 recipients had more difficulty utilizing their vouchers in tighter rental markets);
Fernandez, supra note 8 ("Many property owners and real estate agents say the [Section 8]
program is overly cumbersome, and in a hot rental market, they say, there is no need to take
on a Section 8 tenant.").
69. See Beck, supra note 37, at 163. Arguably, a landlord should not care where tenants
get their money as long as the landlord gets paid. See Beck, supra note 37, at 163.
"'Housing.. . is the one commodity where the race, religion or national origin of the
purchaser determines what he may buy and where he may buy it, regardless of his ability to
pay.... The free enterprise system has broken down and private prejudice has determined
public policy."' MEYER, supra note 12, at 133 (omissions in original) (quoting Nat'l Comm.
Against Discrimination in Hous., A Call on the President of the United States for the
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While the refusal to accept Section 8 vouchers appears racially neutral on
its face, "many housing advocates believe that the acceptability and legality
of Section 8 discrimination enables landlords to use it as a proxy for other
legally prohibited kinds of discrimination, such as that based on race,
ethnicity, national origin, gender, family status, or disability. '70 For
instance, studies show that discrimination against Section 8 voucher holders
71
increases if the recipient is African American or Latino.
Discrimination against Section 8 voucher holders can be used as a proxy
72
for racial discrimination because many recipients are minorities.
Discrimination against the poor and discrimination against minorities are
intertwined:
Because most urban poor are African American, and because the vast
majority of African Americans live in residential ghettos, this economic
bias transforms itself into racial attitudes. "Race thus becomes a proxy,
such that being a Black equates with being a poor tenant or poor
neighbor." And neighborhoods must keep these poor 73
(black) individuals
out, lest their neighborhoods become "ghetto-like" too.
Class-based discrimination and race-based discrimination have become
combined. This is one reason that Section 8 discrimination can be a proxy
for race discrimination.
Issuance of an Executive Order Ending Discrimination in All Federal Housing Programs 3
(Sept. 1961), available at Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, NAACP Papers, 1993
Edition, Box 21, Housing NCDH, Miscellaneous, 1961-1965).
70. Beck, supra note 37, at 155; see also Bacon, supra note 50, at 1295. In many
localities the majority of Section 8 recipients are minorities. See, e.g., Final Brief for
Appellant at 22 & n.20, Graoch Assocs. #33 v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human
Relations Comm'n, No. 06-5561 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 2006) (stating that the majority of
Section 8 recipients in Jefferson County, Kentucky, are from protected classes); FINKEL &
BURON, supra note 8, at 1-8 (stating that in their study "[m]ost of the voucher holders were
extremely low income, minority families, headed by a female"); GREATER NEW ORLEANS
FAIR Hous. ACTION CTR., HOUSING CHOICE IN CRISIS:
AN AUDIT REPORT ON
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER HOLDERS IN THE GREATER NEW

ORLEANS RENTAL HOUSING MARKET 5 (2009), available at http://www.gnofairhousing.org/

pdfs/HousingChoicelnCrisis2009.pdf ("Ninety-nine percent (99%) of voucher holders in
[New Orleans] are African American."); Fernandez, supra note 4 (noting that many Section
8 tenants are "poor, disabled or elderly black and Hispanic residents"). Therefore, the
racially neutral practice of not accepting Section 8 vouchers can "disproportionately limit the
housing opportunities of members of protected groups." McCormack, supra note 28, at 579.
That is why "[l]iability based on disparate impact and business necessity analysis are
appropriate tools for achieving the goals of Title VIII" and perhaps goals within the Section
8 context. Id.
71. Bacon, supra note 50, at 1280 (citing LAWYERS' COMM. FOR BETrER HoUs., INC.,
supra note 45, at 10-11); see also GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR Hous. ACTION CTR., supra

note 70, at 11.
72. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. Because "landlords can generally use
bias against section 8 holders as a pretext for racial discrimination," housing advocates
argue, we should "take more affirmative steps againstdiscriminating landlords via the court
system." Krzewinski, supra note 31, at 327.
73. Krzewinski, supra note 31, at 323 (citing MEYER, supra note 12, at 8; Beck, supra
note 37, at 155; Malaspina, supra note 1, at 291-92); see also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra
note 13, at 1975.
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Studies confirm a racial component in Section 8 discrimination. 74 A
study in Chicago found that "[v]oucher holders are denied access to
approximately 70% of the market rate units that are supposedly available to
them."' 75 This means that "[v]oucher holders must choose from a pool of
only about 30% of the available housing units that are within [the
program's] rental payment guidelines in Chicago. ' 76
The study
additionally showed that "once ethnicity is accounted for, the Housing
Choice Voucher holder who is African-American or Hispanic has an even
smaller opportunity or probability of locating suitable housing. '77 This
study shows that Section 8 voucher holders encounter
discrimination based
78
on more than one trait: income level and race.
These studies indicate that the program has not worked entirely
according to plan (to help end segregated housing). "[M]any recipients end
up using their subsidies to pay for their current low-income housing units or
move within their own segregated neighborhoods. ' 79
Because of
discrimination against voucher holders, many subsidy recipients can only
find housing in neighborhoods where they already "are in the racial
majority." 80
b. Landlord Complaints
Landlords who choose not to participate in the Section 8 program have
many reasons for this choice. To many housing providers, the Section 8
program has a bad reputation. 81 Others find the program's administrative
requirements overly burdensome. 82
i. Reputation of Section 8 Tenants
Many current voucher holders previously resided in public housing. 83 As
public housing projects are being demolished in favor of vouchers, housing
providers fear that these tenants bring the problems of poverty with them
74. See GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR Hous. ACTION CTR., supra note 70, at I];
LAWYERS' COMM. FOR BETTER Hous., INC., supra note 45, at 10-11.
75. LAWYERS' COMM. FOR BETTER Hous., INC., supra note 45, at 11.

76. Id.
77. Id. (noting, in addition, that minorities make up a majority of voucher holders). The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in GraochAssociates #33 v. Louisville/Jefferson
County Metro Human Relations Commission posits that landlords could start out in the
Section 8 program, then when the number of minority applicants increases, decide to back
out of the program. 508 F.3d 366, 376 (6th Cir. 2007).
78. LAWYERS' COMM. FOR BETTER Hous., INC., supra note 45, at 10.

79. Krzewinski, supra note 31, at 320-21; see also LAWYERS' COMM. FOR BETTER
HOUS., INC., supra note 45, at 6 (noting "most families using voucher subsidies end up back
in areas that are racially segregated with high poverty levels"); Malaspina, supra note 1,at
308 ("[A] household's use of Section 8 causes no statistically significant change in the
minority concentration of its neighborhood.").
80. Kushner, The FairHousing Amendments Act of 1988, supra note 30, at 1064.
81. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
83. See Christopher Swope, Subsidizing Blight, GOVERNING, May 2002, at 34, 34.
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into their new neighborhoods. 84 They believe that these tenants are more
likely to cause trouble by not paying their required portion of the rent,
destroying the property, committing crimes, or loitering in the
neighborhood. 85 One landlord who accepts vouchers commented that he
fears sending his wife to collect rent from those tenants because "Section 8
brings a life-style from the city that I tried to escape from .... It's a value
difference. It's all single mothers. They let their kids stay out until
midnight. '86 Additionally, a study in Memphis, Tennessee, suggested that
87
crime in the city followed voucher holders.
ii. Administrative Problems
Although fear of social problems might prevent some landlords from
accepting vouchers, housing activists admit that they do not have concrete
proof that landlords turn away voucher holders because of racial
cite many administrative problems with the
discrimination. 88 Landlords
89
program as a deterrent.
Many landlords simply do not want to deal with the bureaucracy of the
program. 90 In order to participate in Section 8, landlords must allow
apartment inspections, 9 1 an extra step that the landlord otherwise would not
have to take to rent the apartment. The many inspections have been cited as
a major deterrent for landlords who choose not to participate in the
92
program.
"Landlords, property managers and real estate agents argue that the
reluctance to take the vouchers stems from the program's payment delays
and other administrative problems, not the racial or economic background
of applicants." 93 Complying with Section 8 adds additional work for the
landlords. Some landlords receive payment from the tenants, but not the
portion of the rent that comes from the housing authority. 94 Additionally,

84. Id. To avoid the negative stigma of voucher holders bringing problems of the innercity into their new neighborhoods and creating a "horizontal" ghetto in place of a "vertical"
one, one author suggests that Section 8 monitor the placement of voucher holders and limit
the number that could move to any one area. Id.
85. See Howard Husock, Let's End Housing Vouchers, CITY J., Autumn 2000, at 84, 84,

86.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 89-90 (quoting landlord Frank Arceneaux).
See Hanna Rosin, American Murder,ATLANTIC, Jul./Aug. 2008, at 40, 44.
Fernandez, supra note 8.
See GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR Hous. ACTION CTR., supra note 70, at 13;

Fernandez, supra note 8.
90. See Fernandez, supra note 8.
91. See supra notes 57-59. The Housing Quality Standards required by Section 8 might
be "less stringent than the sanitary codes in many localities." Beck, supra note 37, at 175.
So arguably, this is not a valid reason to avoid participating in the program: "Landlords
should not be allowed to refuse to rent to Section 8 recipients because they would rather rent
illegally [under substandard housing conditions] to non-Section 8 tenants." Id. at 166.
92. Fernandez, supra note 8.
93. Id.; see also GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR Hous. ACTION CTR., supra note 70, at 13.
94. See GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR Hous. ACTION CTR., supra note 70, at 13.
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some landlords find
it frustrating to deal with the staff at the housing
95
authority offices.
Participating in the program often causes delays in renting the apartment.
In a study conducted in New Orleans, "[h]ousing providers commonly
stated that it takes as much as two (2) to three (3) months before [the
Housing Authority of New Orleans] signs a lease, and that it consistently
takes 6-8 weeks to sign a contract."'96 Likewise, "[o]ne small-landlord
stated, 'I passed an inspection on June 9th and didn't get paid till August
1lth.' 97 In situations like this, if the landlord did not rent to Section 8
tenants he or she could have started collecting rent immediately.
4. Suggestions for Improvement
The problems facing the Section 8 program directly affect rental
prospects because if a recipient cannot use the voucher, he or she loses it. 9 8
"Public housing and... [v]ouchers are the housing options of last resort for
low-income families," and when those options fail, and "a family cannot
find suitable housing because of discrimination, what options are left? The
most likely answer is living on the street, in shelters, or . . . with
99
relatives."
Many housing advocates support an amendment to the FHA outlawing
discrimination against lawful sources of income and want to include
Section 8 voucher discrimination in that category.' 0 0 Some states have
statutes that ban discrimination based on lawful source of income, but
courts split in how they interpret vouchers and whether they constitute a
01
source of income.1
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Fernandez, supra note 8 ("Hundreds of Section 8 vouchers are terminated each year
because they could not be used successfully; about 1,400 ha[d] been terminated [as of
October, for the year 2007, in New York City]."); see also FINKEL & BURON, supra note 8, at
i ("Under the voucher program, participants must find and lease qualifying units in the
private rental market within the time allowed by the program. . . .Not every family or
individual that receives a Section 8 tenant-based voucher succeeds in finding a qualifying
unit."); Malaspina, supra note 1, at 303 ("A household may spend years on the [public
housing authority] waiting list only to be given sixty days in which to find an apartment."
(footnote omitted)).
99. LAWYERS' COMM. FOR BETTER Hous., INC., supra note 45, at 12.
100. FINKEL & BURON, supra note 8, at 3-17 (finding that "enrollees in programs that are
in jurisdictions with laws that bar discrimination based on source of income (with or without
Section 8) had a statistically significantly higher probability of success of over 12 percentage
points" when compared to enrollees who lived in jurisdictions without such laws); Beck,
supra note 37, at 162, 171 ("Although there are no data comparing Section 8 success rates in
states that have protective statutes with those in states that do not, anecdotal accounts...
suggest that provisions prohibiting discrimination against Section 8 tenants have a positive
effect on Section 8 recipients' ability to locate housing outside of high-poverty
neighborhoods.").
101. Compare Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1112-13 (N.J. 1999)

(holding that Section 8 vouchers constitute a lawful source of rental payment and cannot be
discriminated against), with Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1283 (7th Cir.
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It is likely that "neither this amendment, nor any other single measure is
a panacea. A broad combination of laws, policies, beliefs, and behaviors
must be marshaled to achieve the goal of ensuring that subsidized tenants
have the freedom to choose where they will live."' 102 Indeed, until Congress
amends the FHA or until every state has a statute that bans Section 8
discrimination-and neither is very likely to happen in the near future
because both of those changes erode the voluntary nature of the programthe courts are an important vehicle for solving this housing problem.
C. Using DisparateImpact Analysis To Find Violations of the FHA
The FHA seeks to prohibit acts that discriminate against its protected
classes.' 0 3 The FHA bans actions that have a discriminatory motive;
however, what the Act contemplates regarding actions that may not be
based on a discriminatory motivation,
but nevertheless have a
10 4
discriminatory effect, is less clear.
Generally, when a racially neutral action has a disproportionate impact
on a protected class, a disparate impact test can be used to show violations
of the FHA. 105 The exact parts of the disparate impact test vary in different
jurisdictions but the basic idea remains the same. Under the disparate
impact test the plaintiff has the burden of using statistical evidence to show
that the action taken by the defendant disproportionately impacted members
of a protected class. 10 6 If the plaintiff succeeds, then the burden shifts to
10 7
the defendant to prove that the action had a legitimate business purpose.
If the defendant provides a legitimate business purpose for the action, and
shows that there was no less discriminatory way of achieving the result, he
10 8
or she is not liable for violating the FHA.
1995) (holding that "section 8 vouchers do not constitute a lawful source of income" so they
are not protected by a Wisconsin antidiscrimination housing law).
102. Beck, supra note 37, at 185.
103. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
104. SCHWEMM, supra note 26, at 53; see also George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact,
Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2313, 2319 (2006) ("Modem fair housing legislation has received more equivocal

interpretations, with the circuits split on the availability of claims for disparate impact under
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.").
105. JAMES A. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING: DISCRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION 132-41 (1995).
106. Graoch Assocs. #33 v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human Relations
Comm'n, 508 F.3d 366, 371 (6th Cir. 2007).
107. Id. at 374.
108. See Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 17 (1988)
(per curiam). Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP illustrates how to use the

disparate impact test. Id. In Huntington, the town refused to amend a zoning ordinance to
allow the construction of subsidized housing units in the "white" part of town. Id. at 16-17.

Plaintiffs proved that because minorities constituted the majority of citizens eligible to live
in subsidized housing, the town's refusal to amend the code disproportionately impacted a
protected class. Id. at 17. After plaintiffs proved disparate impact, the burden shifted to the

town to provide a legitimate reason for refusing to amend the code. Id. The town argued that
it refused to allow subsidized housing in the "white" part of town because it wanted to
encourage developers to build in the "deteriorated and needy section of town." Id. Both the
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Disparate impact analysis plays a role in "administering the law, [as] it
allocates the burden of proof between plaintiffs and defendants."' 10 9 A
disparate impact analysis "effectively shift[s] part of the plaintiffs burden
of proving discrimination onto the defendant to prove absence of
discrimination."I 0 The theory also plays a role "[a]t the abstract level of
defining the ultimate aims of the law. ' 111 If one argues that disparate
impact analysis is needed because it is often impossible to prove intent to
discriminate, "it [also] structures debates over equality" and how far to take
the Civil Rights Acts. 112
1. Early Precedent-Griggs
The FHA's wording prohibits discrimination "because of race." 1 3 While
the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the FHA contemplates actions
that have discriminatory effects, many courts have interpreted the FHA,
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, analogously to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which relates to discrimination in employment.14
Title VII similarly prohibits discrimination "because of ... race." 115 The
Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"16 interpreted the "because
of race" language in Title VII to "prohibit[] job requirements with racially
discriminatory effects, even if those requirements were adopted without any
1 17
discriminatory motive."
In Griggs, plaintiffs brought suit against their employer under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.118 The employer required a high school
degree or an intelligence test for employment purposes."l 9 The Court noted
that these requirements did not discriminate based on race, but the
requirements disqualified more minority candidates than white
20
candidates. 1

Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court found that justification inadequate and found
the town had violated the FHA. Id. at 18.
109. Rutherglen, supra note 104, at 2314.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).

114. See McCormack, supra note 28, at 564. "Taken together, the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Housing Rights Act of 1968 constitute what
might be called the Minority Bill of Rights." THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE
OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 350 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997). These
Acts "spell out in considerable detail the rights and protections that are granted to minorities
in the United States." Id.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
116. 401 U.S. 424, 425 (1971).
117. SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at 58-59. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified the
disparate impact analysis in employment cases. Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)); Rutherglen, supra note 104, at 2316-17.
118. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 426.
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The Court saw that in passing Title VII Congress intended "to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees."' 12 1 Given the congressional intent, the Court held that
"practices .. .neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices."' 12 2 Thus, the Court concluded that
Title VII outlawed actions that intended to discriminate as well as actions
23
that had discriminatory effects. 1
The Court studied the legislative history of Title VII and, in order to
effectuate congressional intent, concluded that tests for employment could
be used, but only if the test reliably measured job performance. 124 Here,
requiring a high school diploma or a passing score on an intelligence test
did not relate to job performance and had the effect of barring
African
125
Americans from employment, so the practice violated Title VII.
2. Fair Housing Act Cases
Most courts agree that because the language in Title VII and Title VIII is
so similar, plaintiffs in Title VIII cases can also use a disparate impact
analysis 126 instead of having to prove intent to discriminate in order to
prevail. 127 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on the
issue for Title VIII cases, due to this similarity, in most cases courts allow
"claimants in Title VIII actions ... to demonstrate that an action or practice
carries a discriminatory or segregative impact in order to shift the burden to
the defendant."' 128 The rationale behind the effects test is that it often is
29
very hard for plaintiffs to prove overt discrimination. 1
The closest the Supreme Court has come to addressing disparate impact
for FHA violation cases was in Huntington v. Huntington Branch,
NAACP 130 in 1988. In that case, Huntington, New York, was a segregated
town with the majority of the town's African American population living in
121. Id. at 429-30.
122. Id. at 430.
123. Id. at431.
124. Id. at 436.
125. Id. at 424-25, 436.
126. The disparate impact test is sometimes referred to as an "effects test."
127. KUSHNER, supra note 105, at 134 (footnote omitted); see also 2922 Sherman Ave.
Tenants Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("[S]ince Griggs,
every one of the eleven circuits to have considered the issue has held that the FHA similarly
prohibits not only intentional housing discrimination, but also housing actions having a
disparate impact." (citing John F. Stanton, The FairHousing Act and Insurance: An Update
and the Question of DisabilityDiscrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 141, 174 n. 180 (2002))).
128. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, supra note 30, at 1074
(footnotes omitted). Kushner also notes that "Congress implicitly endorsed the effects test
when it passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and rejected efforts to amend the
bill to require an intent test." Id. at 1075.
129. KUSHNER, supra note 105, at 138-39 (footnote omitted).
130. 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam).
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one secluded area. 13 1 The town's zoning code prohibited multifamily
homes except in areas mainly populated by minorities. 132 A private
developer sought to amend the code and build multifamily, subsidized
housing units in a white part of town. 13 3 Racial minorities would constitute
the majority of people eligible to live in the subsidized housing. 134 The
town rejected the request to amend the code. 135 The developer filed suit
claiming that the town violated the FHA by refusing to change the zoning
code. 136 Since mainly minorities were eligible to live in the subsidized
housing, if the town did not amend the code, a protected class would be
disproportionately adversely affected.1 37 Thus, the plaintiffs argued that the
court should use a disparate impact standard in considering their claim. 138
The case came before the Supreme Court, but the Court did not directly
address the question of whether a disparate impact analysis should be
used. 139 Since both parties already agreed to use a disparate impact test, the
Court would not rule on whether that was the correct test to use. 140 It
accepted the method the parties agreed to without specifically endorsing the
exact analysis used. 14 1 The Supreme Court decided that the plaintiffs had
shown disparate impact, that the defendant did not offer sufficient
justification for its actions, and that the defendant was liable under the
42
FHA.1
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights14 3 also used disparate impact analysis to determine if a violation of
the FHA existed when Arlington Heights refused to change the zoning of
the plaintiffs property to allow government-funded low-income housing to
be built.1 44 The plaintiffs claimed that the refusal to allow the construction
had a disproportionally adverse impact on minorities since minorities
constituted a majority of the people who would qualify for the houses. 145
The Supreme Court held that absent a showing of discriminatory intent
there could be no violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

131. Id. at 16.
132. Id.
133. Id.

134. Id. at 17.
135. Id. at 16.
136. Id. at 16-17.
137. Id.

138. Id. at 17.
139. Id. at 18.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).

144. Id. at 1286-90.
145. Id. at 1286.
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1 46
Constitution.
The plaintiffs did not raise the issue of an FHA violation in
7

that case.

14

On remand, the Seventh Circuit considered an FHA claim. It held that
"[b]ecause a greater number of black people than white people in the
Chicago metropolitan area satisfy the income requirements for federally
subsidized housing, the Village's refusal to permit [Metro Housing
Development Corporation] to construct the project had a greater impact on
black people" and thus also "had the effect of perpetuating segregation in
14 8
Arlington Heights."
Next, the court analyzed whether an effects test should be used to find a
violation of the FHA.149 Consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Griggs,150 the court adopted a broad interpretation of the statutory language
in the FHA, holding that "because of race" means if the "foreseeable
consequence of that act is to discriminate between races" then the defendant
can be held liable without proof of a discriminatory motive. 15 1 The Seventh
Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court used this reasoning in Griggs
because congressional intent in enacting Title VII "was to achieve equality
of employment opportunities-and [so the Court] interpreted [the section]
in a broad fashion in order to effectuate that purpose." 152 Similarly, the
FHA aimed to end segregated housing, and the Seventh Circuit recognized
that requiring a plaintiff to show a discriminatory intent would often be an
53
impossible burden.1
The court concluded by holding that "at least under some circumstances a
violation of [the FHA] can be established by a showing of discriminatory
effect without a showing of discriminatory intent." 154 The court then stated
that it "refuse[d] to conclude that every action which produces
discriminatory effects is illegal," but, rather, "courts must use their
discretion in deciding whether, given the particular circumstances of each
case, relief should be granted under the statute." 155 Then, in its next
sentence, Arlington Heights laid out the disparate impact test to be used in
that jurisdiction. 156 The court also noted, "to liberally construe the Fair
Housing Act, we must decide close cases in favor of integrated housing."' 157
146. Id. at 1287. The Supreme Court, in Washington v. Davis, held that unlike in Title
VII claims, plaintiffs could not use evidence of disparate impact to show a violation of equal
protection under the Constitution. 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
147. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1287.
148. Id. at 1288.
149. Id.
150. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
151. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288.
152. Id. at 1289.
153. Id. at 1290.
154. Id. (noting that the court did not want to create a per se rule that every action that
had a discriminatory effect was a violation of the FHA, and laying out a test to determine
when relief would be granted).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1294.
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3. Disparate Impact Test and Section 8 Claims
Once a housing provider chooses to participate in the Section 8 Voucher
program, he or she can withdraw from the program. Most discrimination
claims based on refusal to accept Section 8 vouchers will be brought under
a disparate impact theory based on racial, sexual, or handicap
discrimination. 158 Government voucher recipients are not a protected class
under the FHA, so a claim cannot proceed under a theory of discrimination
against voucher holders. 159 But, plaintiffs in these cases argue that a
landlord's withdrawal from the program has a disproportionate impact on
60
minorities or the disabled, which are protected classes. 1
Courts use various tests to determine if there has been discrimination in
violation of the FHA based on disparate impact on a protected class
stemming from a racially neutral act. 16 1 As discussed earlier, this is the
basic disparate impact test: (1) the plaintiff proves that the act had a
disparate impact on a protected class; (2) the burden shifts to the defendant
to show that he or she had a legitimate business reason for the action that
could not be achieved in any less discriminatory way; (3) if the defendant
fails to rebut the argument, or if there is "evidence that the justification was
pretextual [it] allows the inferential demonstration of intentional
62
discrimination."1
Once a plaintiff shows that an action disproportionately affects a
protected class, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to defend the
practice. This "lenient burden of proof makes Title VIII litigation
accessible to plaintiffs and forces defendants to explain housing practices in
terms of profit-based, good business policy" since often intent to
163
discriminate is difficult to prove.
In Paula Beck's 1996 article, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The
Fair Housing Act's New Frontier, she notes that the court's refusal in
Knapp v. Eagle PropertyManagement Corp. 164 to apply a disparate impact
analysis in Section 8 withdrawal cases has led that approach to fall out of
favor with the courts. 165 By refusing to follow Knapp and creating a cause
158. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Graoch Assocs. #33 v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human
Relations Comm'n, 508 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2007); Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden
Apartments, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998); Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272
(7th Cir. 1995). Housing advocates also believe landlords use Section 8 discrimination as a
proxy for racial discrimination. See Fernandez, supra note 8.
161. Graoch, 508 F.3d at 371. This Note does not discuss what the burden-shifting test
for disparate impact claims should be or what a plaintiff has to show to prove disparate
impact.
162. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, supra note 30, at 1075 (citing
Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty,
Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1040 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979)).
163. Id. at 1076.
164. 54 F.3d 1272.
165. Beck, supra note 37, at 170-71.
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of action under the FHA, the court in Graoch set the stage for the use of
disparate impact analysis to come back into favor in Section 8 withdrawal
cases. 166

The Supreme Court's failure to rule definitively on the issue of disparate
impact analysis in FHA claims has led to some discrepancy in the courts on
when to use that analysis. 167 The fact that two circuits ruled differently on
the issue of whether the effects test can be used if a landlord withdraws
from the Section 8 voucher program illustrates the wider question of how
and when to use a disparate impact analysis in FHA claims. This Note
discusses the differing views in Knapp and Graoch on whether disparate
impact analysis is appropriate if a landlord withdraws from the Section 8
voucher program.
II. USING A DISPARATE IMPACT TEST IN LANDLORD WITHDRAWAL FROM
SECTION 8 CLAIMS

This part analyzes the circuit court split on whether to use disparate
impact analysis under the FHA if a landlord withdraws from the Section 8
voucher program. Part II.A.1 and Part II.A.2 analyze the Knapp v. Eagle
Property Management Corp. and Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden
Apartments16 8 courts' refusal to apply a disparate impact analysis to find
discrimination under the FHA based on landlord withdrawal from the
Section 8 voucher program. Part II.B analyzes the recent decision in
Graoch Associates #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human
Relations Commission, which disagreed with that position and stated that as
a matter of law, it would consider disparate impact "to show that a landlord
violated the Fair Housing Act by withdrawing from Section 8."169
A. Knapp and Salute-LandlordsExempt from DisparateImpact Claims
Both the Knapp 170 and Salute171 cases held that as a matter of law, a

landlord who withdraws from the Section 8 voucher program cannot be
held liable under the FHA even if that action has a disproportionate impact
on a protected class.

166. See infra Part II.
167. Compare NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co, 978 F.2d 287, 292-93 (7th Cir.

1992) (suggesting it would not be appropriate to do a disparate impact analysis based on
insurance "redlining"), and Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1533 (7th Cir.

1990) (refusing to do a disparate impact analysis in a racial steering claim against realtors),
with Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1984) (using a disparate
impact test in case where a landlord tried to evict all families with children in order to
maintain an adult-only building).
168. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998).
169. Graoch Assocs. #33 v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human Relations
Comm'n, 508 F.3d 366, 369 (6th Cir. 2007).
170. 54 F.3d 1272 (7th Cir. 1995).
171. 136 F.3d293.
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1. Knapp
Knapp was the first case to address the issue of whether the actions of a
landlord who previously participated in the Section 8 voucher program and
then withdrew could give rise to a discrimination claim under the FHA. In
that case, the plaintiff, Linda Knapp, an African American mother of two
children, received rental subsidies from the government through the Section
8 voucher program. 172 She contacted the defendant to inquire about
available apartments and was told that the landlord had vacant apartments
and that he accepted Section 8 vouchers. 173 But, when Knapp finally filled
out an application for an apartment she was told that the landlord decided to
stop accepting the vouchers as rental payment. 174 Knapp filed suit
"alleging that they had discriminatorily refused to rent her an apartment
because of her race and her status as a recipient of federal rent assistance
under the 'section 8' voucher program." 175 The jury determined that the
defendants did not discriminate against Knapp on the basis of race, but that
they did discriminate against her based on her status as a Section 8 voucher
holder. 176 Both Knapp and the defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
On appeal, the plaintiff tried to prove that "the defendants' refusal to
accept any new section 8 tenants disproportionately affected AfricanAmericans" because a high proportion of African American residents in the
county received vouchers. 17 7 In prior cases, the Seventh Circuit used a
disparate impact analysis to determine if a racially neutral act had a
78
disproportionate impact on a protected class, thereby violating the FHA.I
But, the Knapp court rejected using a disparate impact analysis in this case,
stating that "disparate impact analysis is not appropriate in certain
79
contexts."1
Knapp relied on Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights180 where the court "'refuse[d] to conclude that every
action which produces discriminatory effects is illegal. .

.

. Rather, the

courts must use their discretion in deciding whether, given the particular
circumstances of each case, relief should be granted under the statute." ' 18 1
After citing the case for that proposition, the Knapp court then cited two

172.
173.
174.
175.

Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1275.
Id.
Id.
Id.

176. Id. (noting also that the trial court initially awarded the plaintiff $95,000 in damages,
but reduced that number to $1 after determining that she could only recover contractual
damages under the regulations of the Section 8 voucher program).
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 1280.
Id.
Id. (citing NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1992)).
558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290).
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cases where the Seventh Circuit refused to conduct a disparate impact
1 82
analysis to show that the test is not always used in FHA cases.
In Village ofBellwood v. Dwivedi plaintiffs brought suit because of racial
steering practices used by local realtors.' 8 3 The court held for the
defendants stating, "[w]e cannot imagine the practice (innocent in intent,
discriminatory in impact) on which a disparate impact theory might be
based in this case." 18 4
This was because "[e]ither the defendants
deliberately tried to alter their customers' preferences in favor of a pattern
of racially segregated housing," or, in the alternative, "they honestly tried to
serve those preferences-and if they did the latter, but through ineptitude or
sheer bad luck contributed to such a pattern in the western suburbs or (more
realistically) created a risk of resegregation, they did not violate the
statute."' 8 5 The court in Knapp quoted the language in Bellwood, "[s]ome
practices lend themselves to the disparate impact method, others do not," to
support its decision to create a categorical exemption for liability under the
FHA for withdrawing from the Section 8 voucher program. 18 6 Since the
court in Bellwood did not use disparate impact in an FHA case, the court in
Knapp could similarly choose not to do so.
The Knapp court also cited NAACP v. American Family Mutual
Insurance Co. 187 as an example of a case in which an FHA-violation claim
based on a "failure to insure in certain areas . . . [was] not conducive to

disparate impact analysis."' 8 8 In American Family, the defendant conceded
that the FHA claim would be subject to a disparate impact analysis, rather
than an intentional racial discrimination test. 189 But, the court noted,
Huntington and Bellwood "show that [the defendant's] concession may
have been imprudent."' 190 In Huntington, the Supreme Court declined to
decide whether a disparate impact test was appropriate because the parties
agreed to its use. 19 1 In Bellwood, the second case American Family cites,
the court refused to apply disparate impact analysis to a racial steering
claim against realtors. 192 By citing Huntington and Bellwood, American
Family indicates that a disparate impact analysis might not have been the
182. Id. (citing Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 290; Viii. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d
1521, 1533 (7th Cir. 1990)).
183. 895 F.2d at 1525. Racial steering is the practice of showing different neighborhoods

to prospective home buyers depending on their race. Id. at 1529.
184. Id. at 1533 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)).
185. Id.
186. Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Bellwood, 895 F.2d at 1533). This Note studies
withdrawal from the Section 8 voucher program and disparate impact analysis under the
FHA, but this quote in Knapp illustrates the wider split among courts about whether and
when disparate impact analysis should be used in FHA claims. Particularly because the
circuits are split on using the test for the exact same issue, clarification is needed.
187. 978 F.2d 287.
188. Knapp, 54 F.3d at 1280 (citing Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 290).
189. Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 292.
190. Id. at 292-93 (citing Bellwood, 895 F.2d 1521; Huntington v. Huntington Branch,
NAACP, 488 U.S. 15 (1988)).
191. 488 U.S. at 18.
192. Bellwood, 895 F.2d at 1533.
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appropriate test for the failure-to-insure context either. 193 Thus, Bellwood
and American Family suggest that a disparate impact analysis should not
always be used in cases alleging FHA violations. Based on these cases, the
Knapp court concluded that, at least in the Section 8 case before it, it could
94
similarly decline to use a disparate impact analysis.1
The court in Knapp, relying on the voluntary nature of the Section 8
program, concluded that it should not apply disparate impact analysis. 195
The court determined that "[t]he actions of both non-participating and
participating owners have the same impact on minorities and to hold only
the latter liable for racial discrimination for that conduct would deter them
196
from joining or remaining involved in the program."'
In Knapp, the Seventh Circuit ultimately established a categorical
exemption from liability under the FHA for landlords who withdraw from
the Section 8 program, regardless of whether that action had a disparate
impact on a protected class. 197 The plaintiff, Knapp, could not win a claim
against her landlord using a disparate impact test to find a violation of the
98
FHA.1
2. Salute
Similarly, in Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments199 the
landlord accepted Section 8 vouchers, but only from residents approved for
the program after they had already been living there. 200 The two plaintiffs
in this case were disabled Section 8 voucher recipients. 20 1 The landlord
refused to accept the plaintiffs' application for an apartment because they
received Section 8 vouchers. 20 2 The plaintiffs then tried to argue that
refusing to accept vouchers from new tenants after the apartment already
participated in the Section 8 program had a disparate impact on a protected
20 3
class (in this case, people with a disability).
To support their disparate impact claim at the trial court level, the
plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from a sociologist who conducted a
statistical analysis and concluded that "a higher proportion of those
households with a disabled person as householder are eligible for Section 8
benefits than those in households where the householder was not
disabled. '20 4 The trial court expressed doubt that a disparate impact claim
193. Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 292-93.

194. Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir. 1995).
195. Id. at 1280-81.
196. Id. at 1280.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998).

200. Id. at 296.
201. Id. at 294.
202. Id. at 296.
203. Id. at 302.
204. Salute v. Greens, 918 F. Supp. 660, 667 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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that, regardless, the plaintiffs did not
should be used in this context and held
20 5
correctly establish such a claim here.
Plaintiffs appealed the trial court decision.20 6 The Second Circuit cited
Knapp and agreed that since the Section 8 program is voluntary, it would
impact analysis to a landlord's refusal to accept their
not apply disparate
20 7
vouchers.
Knapp and Salute largely based their decisions on the fact that Section 8
is a voluntary program. Because of the voluntary nature of the program,
both cases held that in Section 8 withdrawal cases there could be no cause
of action under the FHA using a disparate impact approach.
B. Graoch-Allow DisparateImpact Claim To ProceedAgainst Landlords
Graoch, decided by the Sixth Circuit in 2007, created the circuit court
split. Graoch would allow plaintiffs to proceed using a disparate impact
analysis to determine if a housing provider violated the FHA by
withdrawing from the Section 8 voucher program.
In this case, the landlord of the Autumn Run apartments, Graoch
Associates (Graoch), originally participated in the Section 8 voucher
program.208 Then, it decided to withdraw from the program and refused to
renew the leases of current Section 8 tenants or accept new leases from
tenants receiving the vouchers. 20 9 At the time Graoch withdrew from the
Section 8 program, eighteen families living at the Autumn Run apartments
received Section 8 vouchers, and seventeen of those families were African
American. 2 10 Additionally, "[a]s of 2003, 6,270 of the 8,849 Jefferson
County residents receiving Section 8 vouchers were black."'2 11 After
Graoch's withdrawal from the program, three Autumn Run tenants and
voucher recipients and the Kentucky Fair Housing Council filed a
with the Metro Human Relations
complaint against the landlord
2 12
Commission (the Commission).
Graoch stated that it withdrew from the program because of disputes with
the local housing authority and the difficulty of meeting the housing quality
standards required by the program. 21 3 The Commission, however,
conducted an investigation and found "probable cause to believe that
Graoch's withdrawal from the Section 8 program constituted unlawful
racial discrimination because it had a disparate impact on blacks." 2 14 Next,
the Commission planned to bring an administrative proceeding against
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 667-68.
Salute, 136 F.3d at 295.
Id. at 302.
Graoch Assocs. #33 v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human Relations

Comm'n, 508 F.3d 366, 369-70 (6th Cir. 2007).

209. Id.
210. Id. at 370.

211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.

214. Id.
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Graoch, but Graoch sought declaratory relief from federal court stating that
2 15
it did not violate the FHA when it withdrew from the Section 8 program.
The trial court found for Graoch and held that a landlord's withdrawal
from the Section 8 voucher program could never violate the FHA "solely
because it has a disparate impact on members of a protected class." 2 16 The
trial court cited Knapp and Salute as precedents and agreed that because of
the voluntary nature of the Section 8 program, using disparate impact
analysis would deter landlords from participating in the program in the first
place. 2 17 The court wrote that if landlords are deterred from joining the
program because of fear of liability under the FHA if he or she chooses to
withdraw from the program, "[s]uch a result would certainly not be
consistent with Congress' intent in creating such program." 2 18 The
2 19
Commission appealed the trial court decision to the Sixth Circuit.
The Commission argued that "[the landlord's] withdrawal from the
Section 8 program constituted unlawful racial discrimination because it had
a disparate impact on blacks." 220 This time, the Sixth Circuit decided that
as a matter of law, a landlord's withdrawal from the Section 8 program
could provide the basis for a discrimination claim under the FHA using a
22 1
disparate impact analysis.
Graoch echoed Arlington Heights's sentiment 222 and stated that "not
every housing practice that has a disparate impact is illegal. '223 To
ascertain which practices were illegal, Graoch would use a disparate impact
analysis and the burden-shifting framework to determine which actions
224
violated the FHA.

The court noted that Knapp and Salute understood Arlington Heights
differently. 225 Knapp and Salute used Arlington Heights to stand for the
proposition that courts "must use their discretion in deciding whether, given
the particular circumstances of each case, relief should be granted under the
statute." 22 6 Under Knapp and Salute's reading of the case, disparate impact
215. Id.
216. Id. at 369.
217. Graoch Assocs. #33 v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human Relations
Comm'n, 430 F. Supp. 2d 679, 679 & n.2 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (noting "the Orwellian absurdity
of a 'voluntary' program attracting participants through a one-way door, past which they
would become trapped forever by the impact of any attempt to leave").

218. Id. at 679 (citing Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir.
1995)).
219. Graoch, 508 F.3d at 370. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court's
decision that as a matter of law a landlord could not be found liable under the FHA for
withdrawing from Section 8. Id. at 369. Still, the Court of Appeals found that there was not
sufficient proof of disparate impact for the Commission to prevail in this case. Id.
220. Id. at 370.
221. Id. at 369.
222. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
223. Graoch, 508 F.3d at 374.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 375.
226. Id. (quoting Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1290 (7th Cir. 1977)).
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analysis would not always be used to determine if a particular practice was
illegal. 227 8 Courts would use their discretion to decide when to use the
22
analysis.
1. Categorical Bans on Disparate Impact Claims Under the FHA
The Sixth Circuit disagreed with Knapp and Salute's reading of
Arlington Heights. 229 Under Knapp and Salute's reading, even if a plaintiff
could succeed using a disparate impact analysis, a court could use its
discretion to decide whether to apply such a test. 2 30 Even in some instances
could win using that test, the court could choose not to
where a plaintiff
2 31
apply it.
Instead, Graoch would conduct a disparate impact analysis and only deny
the use of such a test in situations where "no disparate-impact challenge to a
particular practice ever could succeed under the burden-shifting
framework. ' 232 And only if a disparate impact claim would never succeed
may a court categorically "bar all disparate-impact challenges to that
practice." 233 Graoch concluded that this reasoning also explained the
holdings in NAACP v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. and Village
of Bellwood v. Dwivedi,234 the two cases Knapp relied on to support its
claim that a court can pick and choose when to use a disparate impact
235
analysis.
Graoch saw the cases Knapp cited, American Family and Bellwood, as
cases where a disparate impact claim would never succeed. 236 Therefore, it
reasoned, those courts were justified in refusing to use the analysis in those
situations. 237 It did not see those cases as examples in which a plaintiff
analysis but the court still chose not to
could win using a disparate impact
238
use the test, as Knapp suggested.
Graoch analyzed American Family, where the court would not use
or
disparate impact analysis for insurers who "charg[ed] higher rates
239 It
declin[ed] to write insurance for people who live in particular areas."
determined that it was reasonable not to apply such a test here because
American Family "[c]onduct[ed] an inquiry analogous to... the third step

227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id. (citing Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Id.
Id.

231. Id.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 375-76.
See supra notes 183-97 and accompanying text.
Graoch, 508 F.3d at 375-76.
Id.
Id. at 375.
NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co, 978 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1992).
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in the burden-shifting framework, 240 [and] concluded that the strength of
the insurer's interest in declining to insure in certain areas outweighed the
strength of any possible disparate impact the policy could have." 24 1 Thus,
in such a case a disparate impact claim would never succeed; therefore the
court could categorically bar its use in such contexts.
Similarly, Graoch considered Bellwood to be just such a context where a
disparate impact claim could never succeed, which justified the court's
refusal to apply such a test there. 242 In that case, "the court concluded that
claims of 'racial steering' were not subject to disparate-impact analysis
because racial steering necessarily involves disparate treatment, not a
'24 3
facially neutral policy that has a discriminatory effect.
Graoch agreed that in instances where a plaintiff would never win a
disparate impact test, there was "no reason to require courts to engage in the
Sisyphean task of working through the burden-shifting framework in each
individual case when the plaintiff has no chance of success (for example,
when a plaintiff brings a disparate-impact challenge to a landlord's decision
to charge rent)."' 244 To save time and judicial resources, in cases where a
plaintiff could never win a disparate impact challenge, it would be
appropriate to apply a categorical ban.2 45 But, according to the court, it
would not make sense to apply a bar in cases
where a plaintiff could
246
conceivably win under a disparate impact test.

Graoch did not presume that a plaintiff would always fail using a
disparate impact test in Section 8 withdrawal cases, so such a bar on using
that test would not be appropriate. 247 The court gave a hypothetical
situation in which a plaintiff could succeed using a disparate impact test:
All of the non-Section 8 tenants at a housing complex are white. The
landlord decides to participate in the Section 8 voucher program. A
number of Section 8 participants move in, including the plaintiff. All are
black. The landlord quickly decides to withdraw from Section 8 and
refuses to renew the leases of existing Section 8 tenants. He explains his
decision by saying simply that he no longer wished to participate in the
program, without claiming that his participation
cost him money, time,
24 8
business opportunities, or any other benefit.
Under such a scenario, the plaintiff would succeed if the court allowed a
disparate impact analysis to be used.249 And if some claims can succeed
240. That is, the court determined that the defendant had a legitimate business interest,
which would protect it even if the action had a disproportionately adverse effect on a
protected class.
241. Graoch, 508 F.3d at 375 (citing Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 290-91).
242. Id. at 375-76.
243. Id. (citing Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1533 (7th Cir. 1990)).
244. Id. at 376.
245. Id. at 375-76.
246. Id. at 376.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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under that test, there should not be a categorical bar on using the test in the
given context.
Furthering its disagreement with Knapp's decision, Graoch also noted
that "[n]othing in the text of the FHA instructs us to create practice-specific
exceptions." 250 Therefore, the court would not create, as a matter of law, an
exemption for liability under the FHA for landlords who withdraw from the
Section 8 voucher program.
Green v. Sunpointe Associates25 1 also applied similar reasoning to the
Graoch case. The facts of this case are very similar to Graoch. The
plaintiff was a single African American mother of two children and
received a Section 8 voucher. 2 52 Initially the apartment accepted her
voucher, but the defendant landlord terminated her lease when it chose to
withdraw from the Section 8 program. 2 53 The plaintiff brought suit based
2 54
on discrimination under the FHA using a disparate impact claim.
In this case, the court noted that "it has been made clear that the Section 8
program is to be run in conformance with the requirements of the FHA. 25 5
The FHA states, "All executive departments and agencies shall administer
their programs and activities relating to housing and urban development...
in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of [the Act]." 256 The court
also noted that "[p]articipation in [the Section 8] program requires
compliance with [the FHA]. '' 257 The FHA does not include any provisions
that would exempt landlords who participate in the Section 8 program from
258
liability.
Like in Graoch, the court concluded that if a housing provider withdraws
from the voucher program, "[t]he solution is not ...to impose a per se rule
against disparate impact claims based on a withdrawal from the Section 8
program." 259 Instead, if a plaintiff can prove that the action disparately
impacted a protected class, "a landlord may present his goal to terminate
participation in the Section 8 program as a business necessity. Because

250. Id. at 375. The court also noted that "[ajlthough Congress created the Section 8
program six years after passing the FHA, . . . it did not include language indicating that
Section 8 landlords should be exempt from any FHA requirements." Id. at 376 n.5 (citing
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 653
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437f (2006))).
251. Green v. Sunpointe Assocs., No. C96-1542C, 1997 WL 1526484 (W.D. Wash. May
12, 1997).
252. Id. at*1.
253. Id.
254. Id. at *1, *4 ("[The p]laintiff assert[ed] that 81.8 percent of the 22 Section 8
households at Avalon Ridge are African-American, 100 percent are headed by females, and

100 percent have children.").
255. Id. at *3.
256. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d)).
257. Id. (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 107.20(a)).

258. Id.
259. Id. at *4.
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Congress had made clear that participation in the program remains
260
voluntary, substantial weight must be given to such a goal.
2. The Voluntary Nature of the Section 8 Program
Unlike the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Graoch court did not find it
determinative that the Section 8 program is voluntary. 26 1 Although it is a
voluntary program, if a housing provider withdrew from it for
262 It
discriminatory reasons it could still be held liable under the FHA.
reasoned, "almost every action that could create disparate-impact liability
under the FHA is voluntary" and cited examples, such as "approving
building site plans" and "varying of rent based on number of occupants," as
optional actions by landlords where courts used a disparate impact
2 63
analysis.
In the case related to rent varying, Maki v. Laakko, 264 the court indicated
that it would have considered doing a disparate impact analysis. 265 In the
end, however, the court in Mai did not adopt a disparate impact analysis.
It reasoned that, while the FHA bans discrimination based on familial
status, under "a rental pricing system that charges additional rent for
additional occupants, a mother, father, and one child would be charged the
same amount of rent as three unrelated individuals. Therefore, such a rental
policy is neutral with respect to family status." 26 6 Graoch relied on this
case because this decision shows that a landlord can charge different rents
based on the number of people residing in an apartment if the pricing
scheme does not adversely and disproportionately affect a protected
class. 267 A landlord could not do the same thing if it disparately affected a
protected class and violated the FHA. 268 Similarly, Graoch reasoned,
"[t]he mere fact that a landlord often can withdraw from Section 8 without
violating the terms of Section 8 or the FHA does not mean that withdrawal
' ' 269
from Section 8 never can constitute a violation of the FHA.
Judge Karen Nelson Moore's concurring opinion in Graoch also noted
that "[t]he FHA imposes a non-discrimination mandate on actors engaging
in many different types of voluntary actions" and cited Betsey v. Turtle

260. Id. This means that the voluntary nature of the program may be considered in the
landlord's rebuttal when the court conducts a disparate impact analysis.
261. Graoch Assocs. #33 v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human Relations
Comm'n, 508 F.3d 366, 376-77 (6th Cir. 2007).
262. Id. at 377.
263. Id. (citing Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 263 F.3d 627,
631-32 (6th Cir. 2001); Maki v. Laakko, 88 F.3d 361, 364 (6th Cir. 1996)).
264. 88 F.3d 361.

265.
266.
267.
367.
268.
269.

Id. at 367.
Id.
Graoch, 508 F.3d at 376-77 (citing Maki, 88 F.3d at 364); see also Mai, 88 F.3d at
See Maki, 88 F.3d at 367.
Graoch, 508 F.3d at 377.
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Creek Associates.2 70 In Betsey, the court "allow[ed] a disparate-impact
claim to proceed where a private landlord issued eviction notices to families
with children in an effort to institute an all-adult rental policy." 27 1 In that
case an adult-only conversion policy for an apartment had an adverse
to establish a prima facie
impact on minorities, which could then be used
2 72
FHA.
the
under
impact
case for discriminatory
Maki and Betsey are examples where voluntary acts by landlords might
adversely affect a protected class. If so, the courts would consider a
disparate impact analysis. Since these other cases would use optional
actions by housing providers to give rise to FHA claims under a disparate
to
impact theory, the Graoch court concluded that there was no reason
273
create a special exemption for claims related to Section 8 vouchers.
Regarding the voluntary nature of the Section 8 program, Judge Moore,
in her concurring opinion, opined that it is acceptable for landlords who
decline to participate in the program to be free from legal scrutiny since the
program is voluntary. 2 74 But, that is no reason to exclude a landlord who
has chosen to participate from that scrutiny. 275 Once a landlord voluntarily
joins the Section 8 program, "he or she necessarily accepts a new set of
responsibilities toward tenants under the FHA. ' 276 This would include
"refrain[ing] from intentional discrimination on the basis of a protected
characteristic and, in the case of a business practice that has a disparate
impact on a protected class, to implement when possible an alternative
business practice with less discriminatory effects." 277 For these reasons,
she would allow the plaintiffs to use an effects test to prove a violation of
the FHA by the landlord, if the landlord withdraws from the voucher
27 8
program.
Similarly, the majority opinion also addressed Knapp's conclusion that
landlords who withdraw from the program should not be subject to liability
under the FHA because the program is voluntary, and landlords who do not
participate in the program at all would not be subject to liability. 27 9 Graoch
did not "think that withdrawal and non-participation are functionally
identical. '280 On one hand, "[w]ithdrawal affects an identifiable group:
tenants receiving Section 8 assistance." 2 81 On the other hand, "[n]on270. Id. at 391 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Betsey v.
Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 986-87 (4th Cir. 1984)).
271. Id.
272. Betsey, 736 F.2d at 986-87.
273. Graoch, 508 F.3d at 376-77.

274. Id. at 391 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.

278. See id. at 390 (noting also that "[c]ourts should give the 'broad and inclusive'
language of the FHA a 'generous construction' to effectuate its remedial purpose" (quoting
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 212 (1972))).
279. Id. at 377 (majority opinion).
280. Id.

281. Id.
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participation could be said to have a theoretical impact on members of a
protected class, but the size and composition of the affected group is
indeterminate." 282 Therefore, Graoch believed a legitimate reason existed
to hold withdrawing landlords liable under the FHA, while failing to hold
landlords who did not participate at all to the same liability.
Judge Guido Calabresi's dissent in Salute echoes this same sentiment.
He wrote, "[e]ven if the per se defense were appropriate for landlords who
eschew any involvement with Section 8, it clearly has no place in dealing
with those who have chosen to accept some Section 8 tenants." 283 He
reasoned that there is no reason not to apply a disparate impact analysis
284
under those situations and lamented the majority's reliance on Knapp
because he felt the plaintiffs showed that the landlord's policy had a
"disproportionately adverse effect on the disabled. '285
3. Deterring Landlord Participation in Section 8
Judge Moore's concurring opinion in Graoch also addressed the
argument that allowing a disparate impact claim to proceed would deter
landlord participation in Section 8. She pointed out that "[a] plaintiffs
showing that a withdrawal from the Section 8 program has a disparate effect
on a protected class merely establishes a plaintiffs prima facie case and
does not automatically result in liability." 2 86 The landlord then would have
28 7
the opportunity to show a business necessity to refute the claim.
Additionally, "[l]andlords have a considerable financial incentive to
accept Section 8 tenants because the federal government's subsidy of28a8
portion of the market-based rent expands the pool of available tenants."
And because of "[t]his economic reality [it] makes it less likely that the
potential of disparate-impact claims upon withdrawal from Section 8 will
289
deter landlords from entering the program."
Graoch would allow a claim to proceed under the FHA using a disparate
impact analysis in Section 8 withdrawal cases. The court determined that a
landlord could withdraw from the program for discriminatory reasons. 2 90 A
plaintiff could theoretically prevail in the case using the disparate impact
test. 291 In such a situation, there should not be a categorical ban on landlord
liability.
282. Id.
283. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 312 (2d Cir. 1998)
(Calabresi, J., dissenting).
284. See id. at 312 n.23.
285. Id. at 312.
286. Graoch, 508 F.3d at 392 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
287. Id. (citing Green v. Sunpointe Assocs., No. C96-1542C, 1997 WL 1526484, at *4
(W.D. Wash. May 12, 1997)).

288. Id. (citing Alfred M. Clark III, Can America Afford To Abandon a NationalHousing
Policy?, 6 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 185, 188 (1997)).

289. Id.
290. Id. at 376 (majority opinion).
291. See id.
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III. PROTECTING VICTIMS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION

This Note analyzes the split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Seventh and Second Circuits in Knapp and Salute,292 and the Sixth Circuit
in Graoch293 on whether a landlord can be sued under the FHA using a
disparate impact analysis if the landlord withdraws from the Section 8
voucher program. The Seventh and Second Circuits based their decision 294
to
exempt landlords from liability on the voluntary nature of the program.
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the voluntary nature of the program is not
dispositive and nothing in the text or history of the FHA suggests creating
practice-specific exemptions. 295 This Note argues that the holding in
Graoch should be adopted, and that disparate impact analysis should be
used if a plaintiff can prove that a landlord withdrawing from the Section 8
voucher program disproportionately affected a class protected by the FHA.
Part III.A argues that disparate impact analysis should be used when a
landlord withdraws from the Section 8 voucher program in order to comply
with the goals of the FHA. Next, Part III.B suggests that allowing courts to
use a disparate impact analysis in this situation would not change the
voluntary nature of the Section 8 program. Finally, Part III.C advocates for
using the courts and the disparate impact test as vehicles for upholding civil
rights.
A. Purpose of the FHA
This Note shows the broader question that the Supreme Court has not
ruled on: whether the disparate impact test is correct for FHA claims, and if
so, whether there should be any practice-specific exemptions. This Note
argues that in order to stay true to the intent of the FHA-to end
discriminatory housing practices 2 96-the disparate impact analysis should
be used without creating any practice-specific exemptions. As discussed
297
earlier, that would not lead to automatic liability for the defendant.
Instead, the housing provider would have to prove that the action was
necessary and that it could not achieve the result using a less discriminatory
method. 298 Knapp and Salute's exemptions enable actions that have a
disproportionately adverse effect on protected classes to go unchecked.
This Note sides with the court in Graoch and argues that there is no
reason not to at least allow a disparate impact analysis to determine whether
there has been unlawful discrimination under the FHA based on a
landlord's withdrawal from the Section 8 voucher program. In Graoch's
majority opinion and Salute's dissent, the judges posited that there is no
reason to create a categorical exemption for withdrawals from the Section 8
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
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voucher program. 299 This Note suggests that it would not hurt to conduct a
disparate impact analysis, and, if a landlord withdrew from the program for
discriminatory reasons, he or she should not be shielded from liability. The
purpose of the FHA is to protect against discrimination, so courts should
not have a rule that allows for practice-specific exemptions under which a
housing provider would not be liable for discriminatory practices.
1. Analysis of Arlington Heights
Both Knapp and Graoch used Arlington Heights as precedent. Knapp
relied heavily on Arlington Heights's holding that in some instances a
violation of the FHA can be shown based on an effects test. 300 Knapp took
that language to mean that not in all circumstances should a disparate
impact analysis be used, and determined that withdrawing from the Section
8 voucher program would be a situation when the test should not be used. 30 1
In Arlington Heights the court did, indeed, state that it "refuse[d] to
conclude that every action which produces discriminatory effects is illegal"
and that "the courts must use their discretion in deciding whether, given the
particular circumstances of each case, relief should be granted under the
statute." 30 2 Knapp believed that statement meant that courts have the
discretion to simply pick and choose when to do a disparate impact
analysis. 30 3 To Graoch, on the other hand, that statement meant that a court
would use its discretion as it performed a disparate impact analysis to
4
determine when relief should be granted. 30
Graoch's reading of Arlington Heights seems more accurate. Arlington
Heights said courts should use their discretion, and then in its very next
sentence laid out the disparate impact test to use. 30 5 That structure makes it
more likely that Arlington Heights meant that courts can use their discretion
as they perform the burden-shifting disparate impact test to determine when
to give plaintiffs relief. Knapp's reading-that Arlington Heights left
whether to use an effects test at all up to the court's discretion-seems
incorrect. 30 6 What makes an action that produces a discriminatory effect
legal or illegal would depend on the court's discretion as it conducts a
disparate impact test and considers whether the landlord had appropriate
justifications for the action that disproportionately impacted a protected
class.
Furthermore, the rest of the language of the Arlington Heights opinion
stressed a broad interpretation of the FHA, and in "close cases," instructed
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that courts should rule in favor of integrated housing. 307 That language
strongly suggests that Graoch correctly interpreted the case. Like the FHA,
the Section 8 program aimed to encourage integration in housing. 30 8 As
Arlington Heights suggested, courts should allow plaintiffs to use a
disparate impact test in Section 8 withdrawal cases because that would
favor integrated housing.
2. Using Vouchers as a Proxy for Racial Discrimination
Housing providers may leave the Section 8 voucher program for
discriminatory reasons. One reason landlords might accept Section 8
vouchers is because doing so increases the market of eligible tenants. 309
But if that area gentrifies, landlords might back out of the program in an
effort to attract white or middle-class tenants. 3 10 Gentrification has a racial
component, 31' and Section 8 voucher discrimination can be used as a proxy
for racial discrimination. 3 12 Because of the FHA, landlords cannot be overt
in their discrimination and possibly need to find less obvious ways of doing
it. Because "landlords can generally use bias against Section 8 holders as a
pretext for racial discrimination," we should "take more affirmative steps
against discriminating landlords via the court system. '3 13 Since it is
possible that housing providers could withdraw from the voucher program
for discriminatory reasons, landlords who withdraw should not be given an
exemption from liability under the FHA.
Additionally, in many cities 3 14 the majority of Section 8 voucher
recipients are minorities. Therefore, even if withdrawing from the Section
8 program is a racially neutral act, it disproportionately and adversely
affects a protected class. Landlord withdrawal diminishes minorities'
housing options the most. Thus, disparate impact is the appropriate
analysis, especially in such a circumstance where the voucher status can be
3 15
used as a proxy for racial discrimination.
Furthermore, in Griggs, the seminal employment case, the Supreme
Court used a disparate impact test because "practices ... neutral on their
face, and even neutral in terms of intent cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices. '3 16 Because housing segregated by race and class "freezes" the
status quo, if a landlord backs out of the Section 8 voucher program, courts
should allow disparate impact claims to proceed against landlords
withdrawing from the Section 8 program.
307. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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B. Voluntary Nature of the Section 8 Program
Knapp and Salute reasoned that allowing a disparate impact claim against
a landlord who withdrew from Section 8 would erode the voluntary nature
of the program. 3 17 Their analysis is flawed. Using a disparate impact test
would not mean that a housing provider could never back out but, rather,
that it would have to show a legitimate business reason for doing so. In that
sense, allowing an FHA claim to proceed creates some concern in that it
does add more burden to the landlords. But, the landlord would only be
required to show a valid reason for withdrawing from the program, which
should not be such an undue burden.
Adopting the Graoch standard would not force landlords to remain in the
Section 8 program indefinitely because it would not make it so that a
housing provider cannot ever leave the program-it just cannot do so for
discriminatory reasons. That is the main reason why it cannot hurt to do a
disparate impact analysis. The landlord eschews liability by showing that a
business necessity caused him or her to take the action and he or she could
not do it in a less discriminatory way.
It seems almost as though Salute and Knapp admit that landlords
withdraw from the program for discriminatory reasons. If not, there would
be no harm in allowing a disparate impact claim to proceed.
If
discrimination did not play a part in the withdrawal, no landlords would be
deterred from participating because they would show a legitimate business
reason for their action and avoid liability. One could argue that a landlord
would still have to go into court to prove that to begin with, but civil suits
are often a cost of doing business. A housing provider's activities subject it
to lawsuits and liabilities for any number of reasons.
Knapp continued with more unpersuasive arguments. The court said that
if a landlord never participated in Section 8 it would have the same effect as
a landlord withdrawing from the program. 318 Because the program 3 is
19
voluntary, there can be no liability for a landlord who never participates.
Therefore, it would be unfair to hold a landlord who had once participated
liable. 320 This argument remains unconvincing. It says that because the
court cannot hold everyone liable for discrimination, it will not hold anyone
liable. Graoch correctly concludes that there are reasons to hold a landlord
who withdraws from the program liable under the FHA. 32 1 It would be
difficult to hold nonparticipating landlords liable because an indefinite
amount of people could be affected. 322 In contrast, a withdrawing
3 23
landlord's actions affect a definable class: current tenants with vouchers.
Therefore, withdrawing landlords should be subject to the FHA.
317.
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C. PromotingCivil Rights Through the Courts

Judicial precedents in the realm of civil rights are important. They show
that courts are standing behind the poor and classes that should be protected
by the Fair Housing Act. Court decisions should show that if protected
classes can prove they are being treated differently, this kind of
discrimination will not be tolerated.
If the government allows discrimination in the private sector, the
government effectively sanctions it.3 24 The court system legitimizes the
discrimination by not allowing Section 8 recipients to use a disparate
impact test as in Knapp and Salute. Those cases will not allow such a test
even if the landlord's actions adversely and disproportionately impact a
protected class. Refusing to give plaintiffs a claim against the landlord
amounts to court sanctioning of an act that disparately impacts minorities or
persons with disabilities because they are not given recourse in the judicial
system.
Housing activists admit that they lack concrete proof that landlords turn
away voucher holders as a proxy for racial discrimination, 325 but that is the
reason why disparate impact analysis was created. The courts realized that
it was too difficult for plaintiffs to ever win if they had to rely on overt
racism. 32 6 As with the Supreme Court's practice-changing decision in
Shelley v. Kraemer,327 courts should allow a disparate impact test in Section
8 withdrawal cases and continue to lead the way for governmental reversal
of discrimination. The effects test allows plaintiffs to assert a claim that the
landlord can rebut, instead of affording plaintiffs no recourse at all.
Knapp and Salute were poorly decided. They were the first cases
decided on the subject and set precedents a long time ago. Knapp is a
particularly landlord-friendly and tenant-unfriendly decision. Other courts
disagree with two of its landlord-friendly holdings. 328 For one of its
findings, Knapp held that Section 8 vouchers do not constitute a lawful
source of income under a Wisconsin statute, 329 and other courts hold that
the vouchers do constitute a lawful source of income. 330 And for the topic
of this Note, Knapp held that a disparate impact test cannot be used in
Section 8 withdrawal cases. 33 1 Recently, Graoch declined to follow that
precedent, and other courts should follow this trend instead.
Decided in 2007, Graoch did not have to set a new standard but
nevertheless chose to do so. Section 8 discrimination is an important issue,
perhaps more so than when the Seventh Circuit ruled in Knapp. Since
Knapp's ruling there have been societal changes regarding Section 8
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vouchers.
More and more places have adopted statutes that ban
discrimination based on lawful sources of income, 3 32 including housing
vouchers. It is time for courts to change the test for Section 8 withdrawal to
side with Graoch.
CONCLUSION

Achieving fair housing in the United States is not a goal that will be
easily accomplished. Many changes in our society need to occur. More
courts adopting Graoch's solution can be part of this change to help make
the housing situation better for low-income tenants.
As Beck suggests, one change will not likely solve the problem, but "[a]
broad combination of laws, policies, beliefs, and behaviors must be
marshaled to achieve the goal of ensuring that subsidized tenants have the
freedom to choose where they will live." 333 To start, housing advocates
push for an amendment to the FHA to outlaw Section 8 discrimination, and
334
they push for more states to adopt laws banning it.
There needs to be a combination of approaches to improve housing for
low-income citizens. In the Graoch opinion the Sixth Circuit set up a
solution to try to ensure that at least classes protected under the FHA are
not discriminated against in withdrawals from the Section 8 program.
Adopting the holding in Graoch, and allowing a disparate impact claim to
proceed against a landlord for withdrawing from Section 8, ensures that,
while Section 8 discrimination is still legal, landlords can no longer use
Section 8 discrimination as a proxy for racial discrimination; if their actions
have an unjustifiable and disproportionate impact on a protected class, they
will be liable for violating the FHA. This could ease the plight of the poor
searching for decent housing because it would force landlords to provide a
lawful reason for backing out of the program. That would empower poor,
protected classes to assert their lawful right under the FHA not to be
discriminated against.
The goals of the FHA and the Section 8 voucher program are aligned to
end segregation on the basis of race and income level in housing. By
construing the statutory language of the FHA broadly to comport with the
congressional intent in enacting the statute, the correct test for liability
under the FHA for a landlord who withdraws from the Section 8 voucher
program is a disparate impact test.
In general, to comport with the purpose of the FHA, a disparate impact
test with no practice-specific exemptions needs to be used in Title VIII
cases. Courts should take the lead here; hopefully an amendment to the
FHA will follow, or more places will adopt statutes prohibiting Section 8
discrimination.
Giving plaintiffs a claim gives them power against
discrimination.
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